The Little Engine That Couldn’t (part 3)

So, Tsipras, with the mandate of the Greek people (referendum) in his pocket, waltzed off to Brussels where he was put in a black site jail and water-boarded until he more than caved in to the troika, he handed Greece over to a 21st century German occupation. The Fourth Reich ubermensch have prevailed with Reichsfeldmarschall Schäuble ordering Greece to give up 50 billion euro in national assets to be sold off; to repay a Greek debt that in fact had been European Central Bank money created from thin air.

With Greece up for sale on ebay, the only thing the ‘troika’ hasn’t demanded to now is Greece’s most beautiful women on the auction block (which in a sense has already been accomplished as many women will feel forced into street-walking, catering to wealthy tourists, to feed themselves, their parents, siblings and/or children.)

And then it goes something like this; various emirs, sultans and Saudi princes buy up the Greek islands at a Nazi run fire sale, boatloads of Syrian and Iraqi refugees wash up on their shores (recalling the western democracies intelligence agencies dedication to ‘regime change’) and you have a European Union of Arabia. Sanity and common sense were never in the equation.

The Rehabilitation of Yanis Veroufakis

I’ve become quite the fan of ‘Tyler Durden’ at Zero Hedge. Recall I’d noted (in the previous 2 installments of this ‘little engine that couldn’t series) our ‘boys’ had consistently moved to meet the troika demands until finally Tsipras altogether collapsed under the pressures of gamesmanship. Meanwhile here is what had happened, in effect Tsipras had and has no balls:

[Varoufakis] said he spent the past month warning the Greek cabinet that the ECB would close Greece’s banks to force a deal. When they did, he was prepared to do three things: issue euro-denominated IOUs; apply a “haircut” to the bonds Greek issued to the ECB in 2012, reducing Greece’s debt; and seize control of the Bank of Greece from the ECB.

None of the moves would constitute a Grexit but they would have threatened it. Varoufakis was confident that Greece could not be expelled by the Eurogroup; there is no legal provision for such a move. But only by making Grexit possible could Greece win a better deal. And Varoufakis thought the referendum offered Syriza the mandate they needed to strike with such bold moves – or at least to announce them.

He hinted at this plan on the eve of the referendum, and reports later suggested this was what cost him his job. He offered a clearer explanation.

As the crowds were celebrating on Sunday night in Syntagma Square, Syriza’s six-strong inner cabinet held a critical vote. By four votes to two, Varoufakis failed to win support for his plan, and couldn’t convince Tsipras. He had wanted to enact his “triptych” of measures earlier in the week, when the ECB first forced Greek banks to shut. Sunday night was his final attempt. When he lost his departure was inevitable.

“That very night the government decided that the will of the people, this resounding ‘No’, should not be what energised the energetic approach [Varoufakis plan]. Instead it should lead to major concessions to the other side: the meeting of the council of political leaders, with our Prime Minister accepting the premise that whatever happens, whatever the other side does, we will never respond in any way that challenges them. And essentially that means folding. … You cease to negotiate.”

At the end of the day, Veroufakis’ plan might have worked. My instinct tells me Schäuble’s proposal for a five year ‘Grexit’ was a reverse psychology ploy, a bluff he could get away with, with Veroufakis out of the picture. Then, eighteen German controlled gangsters wouldn’t let Tsipras leave the room until the capitulation & humiliation became absolute and total.

Veroufakis’ mistakes were two; initially not understanding the nature of the beast he was dealing with (an intelligence failure missing the zero good faith on the troika side) and letting (as ‘Tyler Durden’ had noted in one of his excellent assessments) on to his study of ‘game theory’ which, in professional intelligence parlance, allowed the other side develop a model to understand certain possibilities they might be faced with.

Meanwhile, here is a link to Varoufakis’ after the fact radio interview or what’s known as a ‘debriefing’ and here are his initial post-capitulation written thoughts.


The little engine that couldn’t (episode 1)

The little engine that couldn’t (episode 2)

This is last post on my way out (Summer Break.) See you in the fall or perhaps I won’t be back at all